The flaw lies in the login functionality and could allow remote attackers to bypass authentication and tamper with databases. With a public proof of concept already circulating, admins running this PHP-based tool need to scrutinize their setups quickly.

The issue stems from poor input handling in the file /login/index.php, specifically an unnamed function processing the username and password arguments.

Attackers can manipulate these POST parameters to inject malicious SQL payloads, exploiting CWE-89 (SQL Injection). It’s fully remote and unauthenticated, with no privileges or user interaction required, which bumps its danger level.

There are no active exploits in the wild yet, but the proof of concept on GitHub makes this a sitting duck for script kiddies and automated scanners.

The vector breakdown spells trouble: network-accessible (AV: N), low complexity (AC:L), no prerequisites (PR: N/UI: N), unchanged scope ( S: U), and partial impacts across confidentiality (C: L), integrity (I: L), and availability (: LL). Proof-of-concept status no remediation (R ), and recent confirmation (Rincincreaserg)ency.)

It’s popular among small dev teams and educators for its simplicity, but that same bare-bones design skips modern defenses like prepared statements. VulDB entries detail submissions from independent hunters, confirming the flaw’s legitimacy.

Vulnerability Breakdown

Diving deeper, the flaw likely arises from concatenated SQL queries like this classic blunder:

// Secure version using prepared statements (MySQLi)
$stmt = $conn->prepare(
    "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = ? AND password = ?"
);

$stmt->bind_param("ss", $_POST['username'], $_POST['password']);
$stmt->execute();

$result = $stmt->get_result();

Feed it ' OR '1'='1 as username (with blank password), and it authenticates any user. Tweak  ‘ UNION SELECT database(), user(), version()– for info leaks, or ‘; DROP TABLE users; — for destruction (though partial A:L limits full wipes). Real-world payloads from the PoC escalate to dumping hashes or pivoting to other tables.

Why It Matters Technically

This isn’t theoretical. Remote SQLi on a login page means attackers sidestep auth entirely, causing low but real impacts: leaking some user data (C:L), altering records such as review statuses or credentials (I:L), or bogging down queries (A:L).

In a code-review system that exposes source repos, reviewer notes, or linked project data. Chain it with horizontal privilege escalation, say, from a low-priv reviewer account, and you’ve got admin access.

The AI risk analysis nails it: high risk due to public PoC and unauthenticated access. EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) isn’t scored yet, but expect it soon; KEV (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities) candidacy looms if scans light up.

Business hit? Compliance nightmares under GDPR or PCI if PII slips out, plus dev workflow chaos from tainted reviews.

Most exposed: SMBs or academic setups with public-facing instances on LAMP stacks. Default installs often run app DB users with broad perms, think GRANT ALL ON reviewer_db.* TO 'app_user'@'%'. No WAF? You’re toast.

Attack Paths and Detection

Spot it in logs:

• SQL errors like You have an error in your SQL syntax leaking stack traces.
• POSTs to /login/index.php with junk like admin'--, 1' OR 'x'='x, or '; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--.
• Failed logins are spiking, then odd successes from non-existent users.
• DB logs showing rogue queries or unusual SELECTs/UPDATEs from the app IP.

WAF rules trigger on SQLi sigs: select.*from|union.*select|or.*1=1. Tools like Snort or ModSecurity catch '(\s+(and|or)\s+1=1) patterns targeting PHP logins.

Mitigation Roadmap

Patch first: Code Projects hasn’t announced a fix (check code-projects.org/), so yank public exposure or upgrade if 1.x drops. No vendor response yet,t ping them via VulDB submits.

• Input hardening: allowlist usernames (alphanumeric only), hash/salt passwords on the server, and limit login attempts (e.g., via Redis).
• DB lockdown: App user gets SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE access only on specific tables; no DROP or FILE. Rotate creds post-scan.
• Error suppression: mysqli_report(MYSQLI_REPORT_OFF); and generic “Invalid creds” messages, no DB hints.
• Runtime defenses: Enable PDO emulation, CSP headers, and rate-limit /login/*.
• Monitor: Tail logs for anomalies; tools such as OSSEC or Falco can flag SQLi attempts.

Prioritize if EPSS hits 0.5+ or KEV lists it, escalate to P staging-test patches; prod-apply ASAP.

This vuln underscores PHP’s legacy risks: dynamic SQL is hard to die, but param queries save lives. With PoCs loose, expect noise in honeypots soon. Teams on 1.0, audit now, don’t wait for headlines.

Site: cybersecuritypath.com